to experience separation anxiety by virtue of its members experiencing this anxiety. Personally, I doubt that there is any legitimate sense in which a whole can "inherit" an experience in this way from its parts.
But in any case this is not what I am denying. What I am denying is that a collection of people might itself be the primary bearer of an experience. Hereafter, when I ask whether something might be a bearer of experience, that is, a conscious being, I mean to ask whether it might be a primary bearer of experience.
I conclude that the idea that pairs of people lack a sufficient number of immediate parts to be conscious cannot by itself explain The Datum.
Relation
Do pairs of people lack immediate parts capable of standing in the right sorts of relations to each other and their environment to be conscious?
Perhaps. But this cannot be the full explanation of The Datum either. For the only remotely plausible candidate relations are causal-dispositional relations of the general sort borne by the parts of an ordinary human brain (or some other animal brain, or some entire organism) to one another and their environment; these are the relations that things must stand in if they are to jointly function, on a relevant level, like an ordinary human brain. But there is no metaphysical obstacle to two people standing in any such relation. Together, you and I function like an ordinary human brain. Given our new relations to each other and our environment, is it any less absurd to think that the pair we form might itself be conscious? No. To be sure, there is nothing absurd in the idea that McCartney might somehow survive the procedure; though unlikely, perhaps he would remain conscious throughout the ordeal. What seems absurd, rather, is that the pair comprising you and me might be conscious.
Variation in how two people are related to each other and their environment has no significant effect on the absurdity of the idea that the pair itself might be conscious.
I conclude that the idea that pairs of people lack immediate parts capable of standing in the right sorts of relations to each other and their environment to be conscious cannot by itself explain The Datum.
Nature
Do pairs of people lack immediate parts of the right nature to be conscious?
Perhaps. But this cannot be the full explanation of The Datum either. For varying the nature of the members of the pair does not have any significant effect on the absurdity of the idea that the pair itself might be conscious. It is absurd that a pair of people might itself be conscious. But it is equally absurd that a pair of carrots, rocks, dogs, electrons, or neurons might itself be conscious.
If I tell you only that I have two objects in mind, a and b, you need more information before you can determine whether a is conscious and whether b is conscious, but you do not need more information to determine whether the pair comprising a and b is itself conscious. You know by mere reflection that it is not. Pairs of things, we know by mere reflection, cannot themselves be conscious. So there is no need to empirically investigate the individual natures of carrots, rocks, electrons, or neurons to determine whether pairs of them might themselves be experiencing the taste of McDonald's French fries; we know by pure reflection that they are not. In general, the absurdity that any given pair of objects might itself be conscious has nothing to do with the natures of the members of the pair.
I conclude that the idea that pairs of people lack immediate parts of the requisite nature to be conscious cannot by itself explain The Datum.
Structure
How can we know just by reflection that the pair comprising a and b is not itself conscious? Here is one suggestion: we can know by reflection that pairs of things are mere collections, and we can know by reflection that conscious beings are structures. Whereas a collection of things exists whenever those things exist, a structure of things exists only if those things stand in a certain relation required to exhibit the structure. This is not to say that a structure of things is essentially a structure of the particular things that currently exhibit it; some structures can survive the destruction or replacement of some of the things that exhibit them. For an example of a collection, consider the atoms that constitute this clay bowl; for an example of a structure, consider the bowl itself. Intuitively, if we were to spread the atoms evenly throughout the universe, their collection would survive, but the bowl they now form would not. On this informal characterization of a structure, the following entities seem initially to qualify as structures, rather than mere collections: systems, such as a galaxy of stars; certain artifacts, such as a table or a clay bowl; certain non-living natural objects, such as a rock or a planet; and certain living objects, such as an organism, one of its organs, or one of its cells.
Might pairs of people be incapable of experience because they are not structures? Perhaps. But this cannot be the full explanation of The Datum either. To see that it cannot, simply shift your attention from the pair of people inside McCartney's skull to the brain-like system they compose. Unlike the pair, the system is a structure: it would cease to exist if you and I were removed from the skull and placed in isolation chambers (the pair we form would not). Yet this system of people is no better a candidate for being a subject of experience than the pair that constitutes it.
I conclude that the idea that pairs of people are incapable of experience because they are not structures cannot by itself explain The Datum.
Combination of Number, Relation, Nature, and Structure
Perhaps The Datum is explained, not by any one of Number, Relation, Nature, or Structure (the four hypotheses considered above) alone, but by some combination of the four. For instance, perhaps a pair of people cannot itself be conscious because it is a collection resulting from the mere existence of two particular people, whereas a conscious being is a structure resulting from many organs, or billions of cells, or quadrillions of particles, standing to one another and their environment in certain causaldispositional relations.
Before I evaluate this proposal, I want to discuss an appealing line of reasoning behind it: (i) human bodies-physical structures comprising organs, tissues, cells, molecules, and atoms-are conscious; (ii) the salient differences between human bodies and pairs of people are captured by Number, Relation, Nature, and Structure; (iii) none of these four hypotheses alone explains The Datum; hence, (iv) some combination of the four must explain The Datum. In particular, I want to discuss the initial-that is, pre-theoretical-appeal of (i). If asked outside a philosophical context whether human bodies are conscious, most of us are inclined to give a positive answer without hesitation. And yet, if my argument is sound, then it is impossible for a human body to be conscious, for it is not simple. Why, then, are we initially willing to ascribe consciousness to human bodies but not to pairs of people? I have two hypotheses.
First, an ascription of consciousness can be interpreted in one of two ways. On the strong interpretation, an utterance of 'x is conscious' means that x is identical to a conscious being; on the weak interpretation, it means that x is some conscious being's body-that is, that x embodies a conscious being.
Pre-theoretically, we interpret ascriptions of consciousness to human bodies in the weak sense. Our initial willingness to accept that human bodies are conscious is simply a willingness to accept that human bodies embody conscious beings. Otherwise we would have difficulty entertaining scenarios involving disembodiment and reincarnation. But we have no such difficulty. For illustration, imagine waking up, looking into a mirror, and discovering that you have swapped bodies with McCartney. No problem. Now imagine waking up and discovering that your favorite chair has swapped bodies with McCartney's favorite chair. Big problem: the scenario does not make sense. We cannot make sense of chairs "swapping bodies" because our initial conception of them demands that they be identical to such bodies.
By contrast, we can make sense of people swapping bodies, for our initial conception of them does not demand that they be identical to their bodies.
For emphasis, suppose that chairs are conscious, as they are depicted in Disney movies. Then we have no trouble making sense of their swapping bodies. But if we have no trouble imagining their swapping bodies on this supposition, then we must be interpreting the supposition in the weak sense, as the supposition that chairs embody conscious beings (what we imagine, then, is that the embodied beings swap bodies). For, interpreted in the strong sense, the supposition is obviously incompatible with body swapping.
By contrast, we initially interpret the proposal that a pair of people might itself be conscious in the strong sense-as I intend it. For, because we do not consider a pair of people itself to be a body, we never even entertain the idea that it might embody a conscious being.
So one hypothesis as to why we are initially willing to accept that a human body is conscious, but not that a pair of people is conscious, is that we initially interpret the proposal that a human body is conscious in the weak sense, whereas we initially interpret the proposal that a pair of people is conscious in the strong sense. And it seems possible for a human body to embody a conscious being, yet impossible for a pair of people to be identical to a conscious being.
A second hypothesis centers on a difference between the way that a human body is typically presented to our minds and the way that a pair of people is typically presented to our minds. As the human body is typically presented, we are able to ignore its composite aspect. On a daily basis, we see human bodies as single, solid, human-shaped objects. The fact that these objects have left halves, right halves, fingers, hands, arms, and legs is obvious. However, because these parts appear to be spatially continuous with one another, we do not typically see human bodies for what they truly are: structures of organs, tissues, and cells-more fundamentally, structures of quadrillions of tiny particles separated by relatively vast amounts of space. As a result, in certain ways we are able to conceive of our bodies as simples.
Hume makes a related point:
An object, whose different co-existent parts are bound together by a close relation, operates upon the imagination after much the same manner as one perfectly simple and indivisible, and requires not a much greater stretch of thought in order to its conception. From this similarity of operation we attribute a simplicity to it, and feign a principle of union as the support of this simplicity, and the center of all the different parts and qualities of the object. (Treatise I.iv.6) By treating our bodies in many respects as simples, we can take seriously the idea that our bodies are identical to subjects of experience.
However, when our bodies are presented to us in a way that makes it difficult to ignore their composite aspect, we resist ascribing consciousness to them. Leibniz makes the point as follows:
If we imagine that there is a machine whose structure makes it think, sense, and have perceptions, we could conceive it enlarged, keeping the same proportions, so that we could enter into it, as one enters into a mill.
Assuming that, when inspecting its interior, we will only find parts that push one another, and we will never find anything to explain a perception. And so, we should seek perception in the simple substance and not in the composite or in the machine. (Monadology, paragraph 17)
Of course, it is nearly impossible to ignore the composite aspect of a pair of people. And so a second hypothesis as to why we are initially willing to accept that a human body is conscious, but not that a pair of people is conscious, is that human bodies are typically presented to our minds in a way that allows us to ignore their composite aspect, whereas pairs of people are not.
Given the initial plausibility of these two hypotheses, it is important, as we investigate the proposal that some combination of Number, Relation, Nature, and Structure explains The Datum, first that we focus only on the strict interpretation of the question of whether a given thing is conscious, and second that we not ignore the composite aspect of any composite object that is under consideration. Now, one way to show that no combination of Number, Relation, Nature, and Structure can explain The Datum is to consider the human body, not as we ordinarily do, as a solid, human-shaped, object, but rather as a structure of many organs, or of billions of cells, or of quadrillions of particles. We need to make salient the composite aspect of the body. The more salient we make this aspect, the less comfortable we will be ascribing consciousness to the body itself, until, at the limit, the whole idea will seem absurd. My strategy is to close the gap between a pair of people and a human body in stages. I will eliminate the difference first in the number of parts, then in the relation of parts, then in the sort of whole-structure versus collection-that comprises the parts, and finally in the nature of parts. My motivation for proceeding in stages is to help keep salient the composite aspect of the relevant candidates for consciousness. To ensure that the gap is completely closed, in the final stages we will consider the human body itself, not as we typically do, but rather in ways that make it impossible for us to ignore its composite aspect. By the end of the exercise, we will see that no combination of Number, Relation, Nature, and Structure can explain The Datum; and we will see that the human body is no better a candidate for being a subject of experience than a pair of people.
First we eliminate the difference in the number of parts. Instead of considering a pair of people, we consider a collection of several billion people. We have already seen that a mere increase in the number of people has no effect on the absurdity of the idea that their collection might itself be conscious.
Second we eliminate the difference in the relation of parts. Here we can borrow any of a trio of examples from Ned Block 1978.
In Block's "Nation of China" example, we are to imagine that the head of an otherwise normal human contains only miniature two-way radios hooked up to inbound sensory neurons and outbound motor neurons. The radios send and receive signals to and from citizens of China, who are themselves equipped with two-way radios. Block chooses citizens of China because their number is on the order of the number of neurons in a typical human brain. A satellite system displays symbols that can be seen from anywhere in China. Each citizen is given a simple set of instructions: if a given symbol is displayed, then if certain radio signals are received from the sensory neurons, send a given signal to the motor neurons.
Together, the billion or so citizens function, on a relevant level, just as a normal human brain functions. 4 Yet the idea that this collection of people might itself be conscious is absurd. In Block's "Miniature Men in the Head" example, we are to imagine that the head of an otherwise normal human is filled with a group of little men. Block never says how many men; let us assume that it is several billion. Also inside the head is a bank of lights connected to inbound sensory neurons, a bank of buttons connected to outbound motor neurons, and a bulletin board on which a symbol (designating the current state of the system) is posted. Each man is given a simple set of instructions: if a given symbol is posted, then if certain lights are illuminated, press a given button. Together, the billions of men function, on a relevant level, just as a normal human brain functions. Yet the idea that this collection of tiny men might itself be conscious is absurd. In Block's "Elementary-Particle People" example, we are to imagine that the sub-atomic particles in our bodies are gradually replaced with functionally equivalent spaceships piloted by tiny aliens. Our brains (or the objects that replace them, should they not survive the procedure) would continue to function, down to the sub-atomic level, just as they ordinarily would. It seems likely that we would continue to have experience just as we ordinarily would. The question arises: might we, or any other subject of experience, be identical to the envisaged collection of alien-piloted spaceships? Might this collection itself be conscious? If we could see this collection on a greatly magnified level, our visual experience would be much as it would be if we were to witness an invasion of earth by a giant armada of spaceships. The idea that, in addition to the experiences had by the pilots of the ships, there might be a further experience had by the collection comprising the pilots and ships is absurd.
(Block nevertheless concludes that the system constituted by this collection would be conscious. This is because Block assumes from the start that we are composite objects. He says, "Since we know that we are brain-headed systems, and that we have qualia, we know that brain-headed systems can have qualia" (p. 281). Of course, supposing that we are identical to brain-headed systems, and supposing that these systems would survive the envisaged alien invasion, then the elementary-particle-people system would be conscious. But this begs the question of whether we are, or can be, identical to composite objects. The relevant question is not: supposing that we are identical to composite objects, might suchand-such composite object be conscious? But rather: suppositions and philosophical theories aside, might the collection of elementary-particle-people, or the system that comprises it, itself be a subject of experience? To which the intuitive answer is: no.)
Next we shift our attention from collections to the structures they sometimes exhibit. Consider again Block's example of the miniature men in the head. Imagine that the miniature men got inside the head as follows. Very gradually, every neuron of a healthy human brain was replaced with a miniature, functionally equivalent man. At the end of the process, billions of miniature men came to constitute a brain-like structure inside the head. Now, there is no problem imagining that the person whose brain undergoes this process survives; however unlikely, the person might remain conscious throughout the ordeal. What seems hard to imagine, rather, is that the structure constituted by the billions of little men might itself be conscious. To my mind, the idea that this structure of little men might itself experience, say, the taste of blueberries, seems no less absurd than the idea that the collection of little men which constitutes the structure might itself experience the taste of blueberries. Shifting our attention from the collection of little men to the structure they exhibit does not seem to make any difference. Combining Number, Relation, and Structure will not, then, suffice to explain The Datum.
Last we eliminate the difference in the nature of parts. Here I adapt an example from Peter Unger (1990), who adapts his example from Arnold Zuboff (1981) . Imagine that the neurons of your brain are gradually separated from one another without interrupting the flow of communication within your nervous system. The separation proceeds in stages. First, your brain is removed from your body and separated into halves: the hemispheres are placed in nutrient-rich vats miles apart from each other and the de-brained body; radio transceiver devices are implanted at the interfaces of both hemispheres and the peripheral nervous system. Because radio signals travel at the speed of light, and because ordinary crosssynaptic signals travel at far lower speeds, normal communication within your nervous system can be preserved. In the next stage, the halves are themselves halved: each brain quarter is fitted with transceivers and placed several miles from the others. The process is repeated until each of your neurons sits in its own container, miles from the others, hooked up to a complex radio transceiver. Throughout the procedure the system as a whole maintains its functional integrity. Now, to add a further twist to Unger's Zuboffian story, imagine that each neuron is paired up with an understudy-a person who learns to function, at the level of radio inputs and outputs, just as the neuron does. Mondays are then declared "Give a Neuron a Break Day"; on this day the neurons are allowed to rest, while their respective understudies operate their radio transceivers for them.
One question is whether you would survive such a procedure. Perhaps you would. Perhaps you would not. We need not take a stance on this question. For the question that concerns us is whether you (or any other conscious being) might be identical to the scattered system that controls your body. On Mondays, this system comprises billions of people operating billions of radio transceivers. On other days, it comprises billions of neurons operating billions of radio transceivers. In any case, it comprises billions of objects scattered about the surface of the earth, and it interacts with your body just as your brain would have, had it remained confined to your cranium. Now, the idea that you might be identical to this system on Mondays is absurd. But so is the idea that you might be identical to this system on any other day.
Whether the system controlling your body comprises billions of people or billions of neurons seems irrelevant to whether the system might itself be a subject of experience.
One might worry that the scattered state of the system disqualifies it from being a genuine structure. To address this worry, and to ensure that we have completely closed the gap between a pair of people and the human body, we now consider the human body itself, with all its parts intact.
We can make salient the composite aspect of the body without envisaging any changes to the body itself. Instead of manipulating the body, we can manipulate our images of it. Imagine for instance that we are fitted with a series of magical goggles. Each pair provides a higher resolution image of With our most powerful goggles on, we ask: might the system of widely scattered particles before
Conclusion
I have provided an argument that conscious beings must be simple. Granted that we are not simple physical particles, this argument goes against materialism. In addition to my argument, there are a variety of other anti-materialist arguments. Then there are arguments on the other side. While it is admittedly difficult to see which of the arguments is stronger, I want to conclude by giving an initial consideration for thinking that my argument is stronger than what is perhaps the most salient argument in favor of materialism, namely, that the best explanation of the systematic correlations between our mental states and our brain states is that we are identical to our brains.
My argument rests on the following premises:
P1
The Datum (for any pair of people, it is impossible for the pair itself to be conscious).
P2
Something must explain The Datum (there is at least one non-trivial feature that no pair of people could itself have, but which every conscious being must have).
P3
If no combination of Number, Relation, Nature, and Structure explains The Datum, then
Simplicity explains The Datum.
P4
No combination of Number, Nature, Relation, and Structure explains The Datum.
P1 and P2 seem obviously true. A reason to accept P3 is that the various combinations of Number, Nature, Relation, and Structure, on the one hand, together with their rival, Simplicity, on the other, appear to exhaust the reasonable options for explaining The Datum. Reasons to accept P4 were given in my discussion above.
On the other hand, the correlations between our mental states and the states of our brains give us some reason to identify ourselves with our brains, for this identification would begin to explain the correlations. Of course, if we are identical to our brains, we are not simple. So these correlations give us some reason to think that conscious beings are not simple and thus need not be simple.
I doubt that this reason is strong enough to countervail our reasons to accept P1 -P4. For imagine a scenario in which it is common knowledge that our heads are filled with little men who, in concert, control our bodies, and that our mental states are correlated with the states of the little men in a way that mirrors the actual correlation between our mental states and the neural states of our brains.
Certainly this hypothetical correlation would give us some reason to identify ourselves with the systems of little men in our heads. But would it be strong enough to countervail our reasons for accepting P1 -
P4?
Could we really take seriously the idea that we were identical to collections, or systems, of people? I doubt that we could. For I doubt that we could take seriously the idea that a collection, or a system, of people might itself be a subject of experience. But if this hypothetical correlation would not give us strong enough reason to abandon my argument, then it is doubtful that the actual correlation between our states of mind and the states of our brains gives us such reason. For the only difference between the two cases is a difference in the nature of the parts of the candidate systems. And above I gave some considerations for doubting that a difference in the nature of the parts could be relevant.
Evidently, materialists are by and large receptive to these sorts of considerations; for similar considerations are behind the materialist trend to abandon identity-theory in favor of functionalism-a theory on which the nature of the parts of a system is irrelevant to whether the system is itself conscious.
One of the main appeals of functionalism is that it respects the idea that a mere difference in the nature of the parts of a system cannot matter to whether the system is conscious. Hilary Putnam defended this idea on empirical grounds, when he first proposed functionalism in 1967. Ironically, Putnam was simultaneously unwilling to swallow the idea that a system of conscious beings might itself be conscious.
In the midst of arguing that the nature of the parts of a system is not relevant to whether something is in a given mental state, Putnam added to his functionalist analysis a condition that forbids a system of conscious beings from itself being conscious: "No organism capable of feeling pain possesses a decomposition into parts which separately [are capable of feeling pain]" (1967, p. 227) . Why did Putnam do this? The purpose of the condition, according to Putnam, was "to rule out such 'organisms' (if they can count as such) as swarms of bees as single pain-feelers" (op. cit.). Apparently, Putnam did not see the tension in his own views. He held (a) that the nature of the parts of a system is irrelevant to whether the system is conscious (because it is irrelevant to whether the system has a given functional organization) and (b) that it is impossible for a system of conscious beings to be conscious. But he did not hold what follows: that it is impossible for any system of things to be conscious. (To see how this follows, consider a system of people with an arbitrary functional organization. By (b), the system is not conscious. Now replace the people with anything you like, say, neurons. By (a), this change should not matter to whether the system is conscious. So the new system is not conscious. Thus, it is impossible for any system of things to be conscious.) Instead, Putnam added a condition to his functionalist analysis that goes against the very spirit of functionalism. Better, I think, for Putnam to have endorsed what follows from his own convictions-(a) and (b)-namely, that conscious beings must be simple.
I doubt, then, that the systematic correlations between our mental states and our brain states gives us a reason to identify ourselves with our brains that is strong enough to countervail the reasons that I have given to accept that conscious beings must be simple. I leave it as a challenge for the materialist to provide some other countervailing reason. 
